2026 Audio and Speech
I want to thank you for your warm welcome, and to thank the Committee, and
particularly it’s chair, Grett O’Connor, for inviting me to deliver this year’s address.
The invitation to speak here came as a great honour.
Obviously, I don’t need to convince anybody here today that Michael Collins was a
hugely significant figure, that he made a massive contribution to the winning of Irish
independence, or that his contribution could have been even greater had it not been
for the tragic events here at Beal na mBlath 104 years ago.
So, it is a great honour to be here – and also, if I’m totally honest, a bit of a surprise.
If you’re wondering why I’m standing here, please rest assured that so am I.
I am not a politician, so this won’t be a political speech. I’m not a supporter of a
political party, so it won’t be a partisan speech. And I’m not allowed to comment on
current affairs, so it won’t be a topical speech either.
But perhaps that is just as well.
In their excellent book, Michael Collins: The Man and the Revolution, Anne Dolan
and William Murphy claim that “all too often”, the invited speaker at this event “has
been overcome by the temptation to turn his or her speech into a speculation upon
where Collins would have stood on some question of the moment or to remake
Collins in their own image.”
Well, we’ll have to try to avoid that…
But, without trying to artificially place Collins in the debates of today, or to remake
him in our own image, I think we can, we should and we must, learn from our
history and draw lessons from the lives of people like Michael Collins, pointers from
his career as we face the challenges of today.
But we have to choose the right pointers and draw the right lessons.
And a good start, would be to try to distinguish between the complex Collins of real
life, and the one-dimensional Collins we are often presented with.
If you ask most people to describe what Michael Collins looked like, they
will probably mention that famous photograph of him in a general’s uniform on the
day of Arthur Griffith’s funeral. It is, to rely on a much over-used and misused term,
an iconic image.
And it tells a truth: Collins at the time was Commander-in-Chief of the National Army,
fully entitled to wear the uniform.
But does it tell the whole truth? It may lead people to think of Collins as a military
leader, as a soldier, which was a part of his story – but only a part.
The focus on Michael Collins the man of action, the military leader, the man we see
in that uniform, can take away from other aspects of his complex career.
Leading a military campaign may seem more important than acting as the
revolution’s fund-raiser and accountant; but without money, there would have been
no military campaign to lead.
Taking to the barricades might seem more inspiring than reaching a peace
agreement; but without the peace agreement, the time on the barricades would have
been a waste of time.
The idealist is more celebrated in song, story and cinema than the pragmatist; but
idealism without pragmatism can lead to a dead end.
Making peace is less dramatic than waging war; but all wars end, and unless they
end with complete victory or complete defeat, they require compromise. And while
compromise may be seen as a dirty word by some, the truth is
that compromise often requires courage – and can serve a cause better than
intransigence.
This afternoon I want to focus on how Michael Collins rose to the challenge of
compromise, and to how circumstances turned Collins the military organiser, the
intelligence chief and the financial mastermind, into Collins the diplomat,
the negotiator and the constitution maker.
Central to that were three compromises which were made over the course of 1921,
the first and second of which were agreed by a unified independence
movement, while the third shattered the unity of that movement.
The first compromise in the summer of 1921 was to agree to a Truce with the British
– and many Volunteers recognised the implications: a Truce meant talks, which
meant compromise to reach agreement, which in turn meant that the Irish would not
get everything that they wanted.
Collins recognised that reality. He also recognised that neither side had been
defeated, but nor could either side achieve an outright victory – therefore, both sides
would be required to sacrifice some of their red lines to reach a deal.
The second compromise was to agree to enter talks with the British, even though
Prime Minister David Lloyd George had made it abundantly clear that he would insist
on Ireland retaining some link with the British Empire.
There were differences within the Republican Cabinet about where exactly the
compromise would land – whether Ireland would remain within the Empire, or only
be “externally associated” with it, in Éamon de Valera’s phrase. But there was no
doubt that there would be some link, that an isolated Republic could not be
achieved.
As Collins was to put it: “It was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the
compromise.”
In other words, agreeing the Truce and accepting the invitation to London set the
scene for the third compromise, the Treaty which was signed in the early hours of
December 6th, 1921, in Downing Street.
Collins was a reluctant member of the negotiating team. He went to London under
protest, claiming he was merely a simple soldier with no understanding of politics or
diplomacy.
The many, many people who had been outmanoeuvred by Collins in the various
organisations he came to dominate – from the GAA in London, to the
Volunteers, from Sinn Féin to the IRB – might have disagreed with his self-
perception: the reality was that, despite his image, he was intensely political.
And despite that image he was also less of a hard-liner than people thought – he was
interested in gaining as much practical freedom as possible; he was less obsessed
with forms or symbols, particularly the role of the Crown, than were the British,
or were some of his colleagues in the Republican movement.
During the Treaty negotiations, Collins told the businessman and political
activist James Douglas that he placed more importance on winning financial
independence than on the position of the King, provided of course that the King had
no actual power in Ireland. While others were focusing on symbols, Collins was
focusing on practicalities – he was prepared to give way on symbolism to achieve
greater independence in practice.
The British insisted that the new Irish Free State must be part of the Empire, or
Commonwealth as it was just beginning to be called; that it must be a Dominion, like
Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand; and that it must give allegiance to
the Crown, as they did.
But Collins recognised that there was a difference between the position of the
Dominions in law, and their position in practice. Legally, the Dominions were subject
to the Crown and subordinate to the British parliament at Westminster. But in
practice, they were to all intents and purposes independent.
During the negotiations, Collins addressed this issue in a memorandum
he submitted to the British. It was probably written by one of his advisers, but Collins
certainly agreed with and approved what it said.
And what it said was that Ireland’s position under the Treaty should reflect “not… the
present technical, legal status of the Dominions, but… the real position they claim,
and have in fact secured”. He was interested in the practice, rather than the theory.
And it wasn’t just the current position of the Dominions he was thinking about; he
was thinking about their position in the future as well. As he wrote some months
later, the Dominions would eventually separate from Britain “by a process of natural
evolution”, and therefore: “we should do well to have a little patience”.
This could be seen as an argument for accepting a less than perfect deal in the hope
that it could be improved on in future. But it was also a promise of strength in
numbers: the Dominions, as they evolved towards independence, would bring
Ireland with them, and it would be in their own self-interest to ensure that
Britain couldn’t prevent Ireland from advancing towards freedom.
This was why in the Treaty, the new Irish Free State was to have the same “law,
practice and constitutional usage” relating to the Crown as did Canada, where the
royal power to veto legislation had been unused for so long that it was understood to
be ‘extinct’: Ireland was to get the same autonomy in practice that the Dominions
had secured for themselves.
Within the Dáil cabinet, de Valera, Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack believed that the
Treaty surrendered too much, that holding out for more – even at the risk of renewed
war – would have been preferable.
Collins and Arthur Griffith disagreed, feeling they had pushed the British as far as
was possible, and that the British would never agree to Irish independence unless
some formal link with the Crown was retained.
The protentional evolution of Dominion status to full independence was one reason
Collins signed the Treaty; another was that he believed – along with almost every
other member of the Dáil – that the proposed Boundary Commission would hand
over to the Free State a huge slice of Northern Ireland, thereby making the devolved
government of Northern Ireland unworkable – in other words, he saw the Treaty as
undermining, not copper fastening, partition.
His other reason for signing was very simple. As he put it during the Treaty debates:
“In a contest between a great Empire and a small nation, this was as far as the small
nation could get. Until the British Empire was destroyed Ireland could get no more.”
He believed the alternative to the Treaty was a new war with Britain, a war in which
the shackles would come off, and world opinion would be firmly behind London.
We’ll never know if he was right or wrong on this, but there was at least the
possibility of much worse violence being inflicted on the Irish people, and world
opinion might have been more tolerant of that violence if the British could claim a
good deal had been wilfully rejected by the Irish. It was a risk he wasn’t prepared to
take.
Opponents of the Treaty thought that Dominion status would be a
straitjacket, something fixed and immutable which would bar the way to freedom in
the future.
This wasn’t an unreasonable assumption at the time, because the British were
saying much the same. Winston Churchill said that the Treaty would “stand for all
time as a measure and symbol of the relationship which should exist between these
two islands”.
But there was a recognition at the highest levels of British politics that to agree to
Dominion status was in effect to agree to independence. Lloyd George had said in
1920 that the Dominions were “virtually independent States and could secede at any
time if they chose”.
That, of course, was when Lloyd George was refusing to consider Dominion status
for Ireland; by the time the Treaty was agreed, he was desperate to convince the
Tory MPs who kept him in power that the Dominion status contained in the Treaty
would keep Ireland in the Empire forever.
As we have seen, it was Collins, more than anyone, who saw that this was not true,
that Dominion status would evolve, and that this evolution offered opportunities.
His most famous expression of this idea came during the Treaty debates, when he
said: “In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations
desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it.”
Once the Treaty was passed, it fell to Collins and his colleagues to begin the process
of implementing it, by establishing a Provisional Government, taking over
the administration, including Dublin Castle, and creating a new Constitution for the
new state.
Collins the constitution-maker is possibly not the first image of him that springs to
most peoples’ minds, but he chaired the first meeting of the drafting committee and –
more importantly – set out its instructions.
The Constitution, he said, was more important than the Treaty. He wanted “a free
democratic constitution”, he said, “as free as possible”. He didn’t want any
references to the Crown or to the Commonwealth or to the Oath demanded of
members of the Oireachtas – they were in the Treaty already and he didn’t think they
needed to be repeated. In short, he wanted the Constitution to be as republican as it
could be.
This was important because there were opponents of the Treaty – people like Austin
Stack and Liam Lynch – who believed Collins would be able to deliver a Republican
constitution which would be acceptable to them.
In other words, if Collins had been able to produce the Constitution he wanted, there
would have been no need, no cause, for the Civil War.
This conciliatory approach was also demonstrated in his agreement with de Valera of
an electoral pact, under which pro- and anti-Treaty Sinn Féin candidates would be
presented to the electorate as a “Panel”, in proportion to their strength in the
outgoing Dáil.
The problem was that this symbol of republican unity was like a red rag to a bull,
particularly if that Bull was called John. The British had always been unlikely to
accept a republican constitution; there was no way they would do so if they thought it
might bring de Valera back to power.
So, six months after the Treaty negotiations, Collins was back in London negotiating
the Free State’s constitution with the British, making many of the same arguments he
had made during the Treaty talks, facing much the same brick wall of intransigence,
and with the same result.
He told his fiancé, Kitty Kiernan, that things were “far, far more serious than anyone
at home thinks”, that they were “bad beyond words”, and that “the whole thing is
ghastly”.
Led by Collins, the Irish did manage to reduce the Crown’s presence in the
Constitution to the bare minimum the British would accept – but that bare minimum
was still there, destroying any hope of reuniting the republican movement.
The result, of course, was an enduring split, a Civil War, and, for Collins personally, a
date with fate on this roadway.
Michael Collins was not to see it, but just four years later in October 1926, a century
ago this year, the British government made a statement which on the face of it –
given their position during the Treaty negotiations – was astonishing.
In what became known as the Balfour Declaration, the British accepted that the UK
and the Dominions were “autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal
in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or
external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely
associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’
It was a recognition that the Dominions were legally equal to Britain, and it was
followed in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster which formally recognised that the
British Parliament could no longer legislate for the Dominions, and that the
Dominions could pass any law they liked – including a law to leave the
Commonwealth.
The restraints imposed by the Treaty had been destroyed and the way to full
sovereignty and independence for the Irish state had been cleared. And that route to
freedom would be used, with the introduction of the 1937 Constitution, and then the
Declaration of the Republic a dozen years later.
This was Michael Collins’s vision.
The evolution and development of the Dominions, driven by South Africa and
Canada as well as by Ireland, had cleared the path to full independence.
As at least some on the British side ruefully recognised, by forcing Ireland to become
a Dominion, they hadn’t changed Ireland, but they had changed the
Commonwealth – which is why Collins should be recognised, not just as a maker of
modern Ireland, but as a maker of the modern British Commonwealth as well.
More importantly, the patience Collins had called for had been rewarded, the
compromises he had made had been justified, the Treaty he had signed had indeed
given the freedom to achieve freedom.
Michael Collins the soldier, the intelligence chief, the financial mastermind, was
crucial to the conduct of the War of Independence.
But Michael Collins the diplomat, the negotiator and the constitution maker was no
less crucial to moulding a compromise which secured the essential interests of the
nation he represented, and the cause he led.
And we can draw from that what lessons we need for today.
